Stackelberg Security Games and polyhedral spaces Pamela Alejandra Bustamante Faundez 1 pebustamante@uc.com 1Ponti cia Universidad Cat olica de Chile October, 2020 Pamela Bustamante (PUC Chile) SSG and polyhedral spaces October, 20201/4 Instead of taking into account every single pure strategy, this set is represented through the frequency in which each target is Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. 2011). 3, Christopher Kiekintveld. Stackelberg Security games in the proposed work correspond to allocating the resources for the multiple patients' body sensor information with high strategy level space. Albarran and Clempner 15 developed a solution for Stackelberg security games based in partially observable Markov games. In these real-world domains, an important challenge facing the security The dynamics of the game involves defend-. A. Abrahamyan 75 discussed. A defender’s pure strategy is a subset of targets from Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted widely for modeling adversarial interactions, wherein scalability of equi-librium computation is an important research problem. A Stackelberg game is a game played sequentially between two players: the first player is the leader who commits to a strategy first, and then the sec- In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (pp. The term Stackelberg security games (SSG) was first introduced by Kiekintveld et al. The Stackelberg security game theory has been extensively developed in the Markov games literature. Finally, we explore properties of the discussed models empirically in the context of email spam filtering. Security games … Stackelberg security games have received much attention in recent years. Much of the existing work focuses on single- Nevertheless, the loss is lower in the Stackelberg duopoly than in Cournot’s. show that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem. Abstractâ Stackelberg security games are represented by a Stackelberg model for multiple defenders and attackers. ... We show that the Stackelberg prediction game generalizes existing prediction models. Simulation-based methods in multi-step Stackelberg Security Games in the context of homeland security. Stackelberg Security Games is provided and its applicability in information security domain is. 5 1. 1, Fei Fang. The leader’s commitment is observed by the follower, who then plays a best response to the leader’s strategy. Solis et al 16 presented a model for computing optimal randomized security policies in Stackelberg security games for multiple players handling a Kullback‐Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling the patrol strategies. Second, resolving the leader’s dilemma, it shows that under a natural restriction on se-curity games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium 2 Stackelberg Security Games Stackelberg games were first introduced to model leadership and commitment (von Stackelberg (1934)). 22 - Basic Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Stackelberg Security Games By Christopher Kiekintveld , Manish Jain Edited by Ali E. Abbas , University of Southern California , Milind Tambe , University of Southern California , Detlof von Winterfeldt , University of Southern California Second, under a natural restriction on security games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy; and furthermore, the solution is unique in a class of security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. To date, the analysis of Stackelberg security games has focused primarily on computing Strong Stackelberg Equi-librium (SSE), and many algorithms have been develope- of security games. Trejo et al 2 suggested an approach for developing attacker-defender Stackelberg security games based on Markov games employing The defender allocates resources Rto protect a set of targets T. Let n = jTj. Security Administration (TSA) is currently evaluating the GUARDS system for use in scheduling airport security op-erations (Pita et al. [ 12] to describe specializations of a particular type of Stackelberg game for security as discussed below. tainty in Stackelberg security games. Stackelberg Security Games: Looking Beyond a Decade of Success Arunesh Sinha1, Fei Fang2, Bo An3, Christopher Kiekintveld4, Milind Tambe5 1 University of Michigan 2 Carnegie Mellon University 3 Nanyang Technological University 4 University of Texas at El Paso 5 University of Southern California arunesh@umich.edu, feifang@cmu.edu, boan@ntu.edu.sg, cdkiekintveld@utep.edu, tambe@usc.edu The systems deployed are based on fast algorithms for solving large instances of Bayesian Stackelberg games that capture the interaction between security forces and adversaries. INTRODUCTION A Stackelberg game includes two players — the leader and the follower. Stackelberg Security Games A generic Stackelberg security game has two players, a de-fender which first decides how to use midentical resources to protect a set of targets T(m<|T|), and an attacker which observes the defender’s strategy before choosing a target to attack. There is a large body of research on this topic with many successful applications [1, 25]. Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness Daniel Redelmeier 5 November 2015 There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model; for example, these games are at the heart of major applications such as the ARMOR program deployed for security at the LAX airport since 2007 and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). Additional Key Words and Phrases: No-regret learning, Stackelberg security games 1. recent development of models to assist security forces in randomizing their patrols and their deployment in real applications. After Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm published the foundational paper on the Stackelberg game applied in the field of security protection in 2006, a large number of applications of the Stackelberg game in various security issues will hopefully improve the intelligent decision-making solutions to complex security problems. Stackelberg games were first introduced to model leadership and commitment [ 11]. In order to paint a cohesive picture, we focus on one type of uncertainty: unknown attacker utilities. One of the key points of the scalability of SSG is the representation of the set of strategies of the defender. 11/11/17 - Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted widely for modeling adversarial interactions. Stackelberg games for adversarial prediction problems. Arunesh Sinha. Stackelberg security games (SSGs) offer a framework to optimize allocation of defense resources against strategic adversaries. Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria are stable in a static model of just one period. Stackelberg Security Games: Looking Beyond a Decade of Success. Stackelberg Security games on multiple patient information are described as Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human interaction, such as oligopolistic markets and security domains. We show that security games exhibit a phase transition at 0:5 for random Stackelberg security game instances, and that this phase transition corresponds to the computationally hardest instances at the d:sratio of 0:5. 4, Milind Tambe. While most existing work focuses on single-defender settings, there are many real-world scenarios that involve multiple defenders (e.g., multi-national anti-crime actions in international waters, different security agencies patrolling the … plication of Stackelberg models in addressing security chal-lenges, also known as Stackelberg security games (SSGs). This interest is driven in part by a number of high-impact deployed security applications [Tambe, 2011]. Several facts are mentioned to state the goodness of information security management modeling of financial systems. Stackelberg Security Games Results are applied to security games between defenders and attackers, where the noncooperative behaviors are well characterized by the features of the learning process in Stackelberg games. ing the structure of these security games, the paper shows that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alle-viating the equilibrium selection problem. For the realization of the SSG, we propose a new partially observed random walk technique for the randomization in the scheduling of the patrol planning. Firstly, we formulate the interaction between the defender and the attacker as a Stackelberg game. A secrecy capacity is maintained with the Stackelberg using the maximum rate of reliable information. Imitative Attacker Deception in Stackelberg Security Games Thanh Nguyen1y and Haifeng Xu2 1University of Oregon 2Harvard University thanhhng@cs.uoregon.edu, hxu@seas.harvard.edu Abstract To address the challenge ofuncertaintyregarding theattacker's payoffs, capabilities and other char-acteristics, recent work in security games has fo- The leader plays first by committing to a mixed strategy. 2. Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games. Security Games with Arbitrary Schedules A security game is a two-player Stackelberg game played between an attacker and a defender. Classical game equilibrium models, including Stackelberg Equilibrium, assume perfect rationality of the players. Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. Stackelberg Security games are presented in [9], [4]. 2017 14th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic … 805-810). 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